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Abstract
In this article, the term “radicalisation” is discussed as a process that appears to be a defensive and reactionary response of
various individuals suffering from social, economic, and political forms of exclusion, subordination, alienation, humiliation,
and isolation. To that effect, the article challenges the mainstream understanding of radicalisation. In doing so, the work
concentrates on the elaboration of reactionary radicalisation processes of self‐identified Muslim youth and self‐identified
native youth residing in Europe. The main reason behind the selection of these two groups is the assumption that both
groups are co‐radicalizing each other in the contemporary world that is defined by the ascendance of a civilizational polit‐
ical discourse since the war in the Balkans in the 1990s. Based on the findings of in‐depth interviews conducted with
youngsters from both groups in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the work demonstrates that the main
drivers of the radicalisation processes of these two groups cannot be explicated through the reproduction of civilizational,
cultural, and religious differences. Instead, the drivers of radicalisation for both groups are very identical as they are both
socio‐economically, politically, and psychologically deprived of certain elements constrained by the flows of globalization
and dominant forms of neo‐liberal governance.
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1. Introduction
In this article, the term “radicalisation” will be discussed
from an interdisciplinary perspective as a process that
appears to be a defensive and reactionary response of
various individuals suffering from the detrimental effects
of modernisation and globalisation such as social, eco‐
nomic, and political forms of exclusion, subordination,
alienation, and isolation. Following the theoretical inter‐
ventions from within sociology, politics, anthropology,
geography and psychology, the article will challenge the
mainstream understanding of radicalisation. In doing so,
referring to the three‐fold classification of radicalisation
by Craig Calhoun, the article will concentrate on the elab‐
oration of reactionary radicalisation processes of Islamic
youth and right‐wing populist native youth residing in
Europe. The work will also rely on the theoretical inter‐
ventions of Charles Tilly on the three forms of collective
mobilization with a particular focus on a defensive form
ofmobilization, which is likely to bemore explanatory for
the Islamist and nativist youthmobilisation in contempo‐
rary Europe. Last but not least, the article will also bene‐
fit from the works of various psychology scholars such as
Gordon W. Allport and Henri Tajfel who tend to put the
emphasis on socio‐economic characteristics to under‐
stand the root causes of radicalisation. In parallel with
the former perspectives in sociology and politics, this
strand of psychology draws attention to socio‐economic
deprivation and grievance as the main drivers of radical‐
isation of both youth groups (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015).
This article claims that it is conceivable to per‐
ceive the rise of both Islamist and right‐wing nativist‐
populist forms of expressions among some youth groups
in Europe as a radical stance against different manifes‐
tations of modernisation and globalisation. The term
“Islamist” is used in the text to address those youngsters
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with Muslim background, who are becoming politically
more engaged in identifying themselves with Islam in
the age of growing anti‐Muslim racism. In this regard,
Islamism becomes for these youngsters more than
merely a “religion” in the narrow sense of theological
belief, private prayer, and ritual worship, and also serves
as a reactionary way of life with guidance for political,
economic, and social behaviour. To that effect, Islamism
of such young individuals is differentiated from the ide‐
ology of those participants in violent extremist and ter‐
rorist groups (i.e., Al‐Qaeda, ISIS). The term “nativist”
is used throughout the text to refer to those self‐
identified native youngsters who are explicitly express‐
ing their feelings of socio‐economic, spatial, and nos‐
talgic deprivation caused by ongoing deindustrialisation,
unemployment, poverty, and diversity. In this sense,
the term does not include those who are engaged in
white supremacist extremist groups (i.e., Identitarian
Movement, Combat‐18, and the Soldiers of Odin).
The main premise of the article is that self‐identified
young Muslims manifest their reactionary radicalisation
by revitalizing the 14th‐century Khaldunian notion of
asabiyya based on the instrumentalisation of honour,
generating unconventional forms of political participa‐
tion and resisting intersectional forms of discrimina‐
tion while self‐identified native youngsters are more
likely to becomenostalgic, nationalist, Islamophobic, and
anti‐multiculturalist. Such a premise does not of course
exclude the probability that both groups might also be
influenced by other ideological and societal drivers.
The article will elaborate reactionary radicalism from
both theoretical and empirical findings driven from the
ongoing research, which is designed to give a more
nuanced explanation of radicalisation with a focus on
both migrant‐origin young people who identify them‐
selves as Muslim (hereafter, “Muslims”) and young peo‐
ple who self‐identify as natives in certain European
cities in which extreme‐right is particularly strong (here‐
after, “natives”). Brussels, Cologne, Berlin, Paris, and
Amsterdam were chosen to interview Turkish and
Moroccan‐origin youths while Aalst, Lyon, Dresden, and
Rotterdam were cities selected to interview right‐wing
native youths. In each city, around 20 interviews were
conducted with each group of youngsters in native lan‐
guages by native researchers working under the supervi‐
sion of the author, the principal investigator. The total
number of interviews conducted in these cities in the
first round of the fieldwork in 2020 was 160. The for‐
mer group of cities was chosen because of the rela‐
tively high‐number of Muslim‐origin residents, while the
latter was chosen because of their remoteness to the
political centres. By asking a set of open‐ended ques‐
tions inquiring about demographic and socio‐economic
aspects of everyday life, interaction with members of
the neighbourhood, conventional and non‐conventional
forms of political participation, multiculturalism, diver‐
sity, mobility, spatial elements, and globalisation, the
purpose of the interviews was to understand the root
causes of their reactionary nativist or Islamist radicali‐
sation. Based on the theoretical and empirical findings
of the same research, the article provides a compara‐
tive account on reactionism in Europe by focusing on the
case of radicalised youth, and how radicalising Muslim
and native youth groups mutually feed of each other.
Since the interview questions specifically focused on
demographic, socio‐economic, environmental, and local
aspects of everyday life without falling into the cultural‐
ist trap, it is assumed that the results of this study can
be broadly applicable to many different types of young
people or situations.
The main reason behind the selection of Muslim
youth and native youth residing in Europe is the fact that
some segments of both groups are co‐radicalising each
other in the contemporary world since September 11,
2001 (Obaidi et al., 2018). The term co‐radicalisation is
mostly used in psychology literature, and it is derived
from the observation that intergroup hostility gener‐
ates intergroup conflict, or increases existing ones,
through ideological extremization (Pyszczynski et al.,
2008). These intergroup conflicts that are currently expe‐
rienced at symbolic level through the media have a
propensity to perpetuate themselves through cycles of
reciprocal threat, violence and/or extremization (Kunst
et al., 2016). The work assumes that the main drivers
of the radicalisation processes of these two groups can‐
not be explicated through the reproduction of civilisa‐
tional, cultural, and religious discourses. Instead, the
drivers of radicalisation in both groups are very identi‐
cal as they are socio‐economically, politically, and psy‐
chologically deprived of certain elements constrained
by the flows of globalization and dominant forms of
neo‐liberal governance.
2. History of the Term Radicalisation
Though the term “radicalisation” is mostly associated
with Islamist and white‐supremacist groups nowadays,
it has been in circulation for several centuries. Let us
take a look at the history of the term now. Defining
radicalisation has been problematic within social sci‐
ences. Radicalisation implies a direct support or enact‐
ment of radical behaviour and therefore begs the ques‐
tion: How does one define radical behaviour? As social
sciences have grown ever more interest in understand‐
ing and explaining contextual and societal nuances cross‐
culturally, what appears to be radical or core truth
becomes very difficult to answer.
The term “radical” comes from the Latin word of
radix (root) while the term “radicalisation” literally
means the process of “going back to the roots.” “Radical”
refers to roots of plants, words, or numbers. Early
modern thinkers used the term “radical” when they
talked about foundations, fundaments, or first princi‐
ples (Calhoun, 2011). The mainstream definition of “rad‐
icalism,” such as the one given in the Oxford dictio‐
nary, sees it as “the beliefs or actions of people who
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advocate thorough or complete political or social reform”
(Radicalism, n.d.). The term “radical” was already used
in the 18th century, and it is often linked to the
Enlightenment and the French and American revolu‐
tions of that period. The term became more popu‐
lar in 19th century only, when it often referred to a
political agenda advocating thorough social and politi‐
cal reform. In this sense, radicalism comprised of secu‐
larism, pro‐democratic components, pluralist, and even
equalitarian demands such as egalitarian citizenship and
universal suffrage (Bötticher, 2017; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015,
p. 13). Afterwards, an association between radicalisa‐
tion and left‐wing violence was maintained in the sec‐
ond half of the 20th century, throughout the 1960s, to
designate civil rights activists and rioters of the May 68
uprisings. It is only from the years 2000 and especially
2010 that the word “radicalisation” started to change in
its current meaning as a process leading to violent action
in general, especially with regards to Islamist terrorism
(Khosrokhavar, 2014).
Referring to the work of Huyssen (1995) that is
discussing the age of amnesia, some scholars such as
Kansteiner (2002, pp. 192–193) and Lowenthal (2015),
draw our attention to the fact that collective memory
may quickly pass into oblivion without shaping the his‐
torical imagination of any individual or social group.
Nowadays, for many, “the past that antedates their
own lived experiences is dead and gone and therefore
irrelevant. They assume the past to be a foreign coun‐
try disconnected from their own country, the present”
(Lowenthal, 2015, p. 592). Thus, in such an internet age,
it becomes pertinent formany individuals to forget about
the earlier facts, debates, events, and concepts which
antedates their own lived experiences. It is highly likely
that many individuals have disremembered that there
were also radicals before who made the world a better,
more democratic, and more pluralist place. It should be
because of this forgetfulness, many political opponents
of radicals tend to portray them as violent revolutionar‐
ies as a first attempt to psychologize political opposition
for status‐quo maintaining purposes (Sartori, 1984).
This brief historical and conceptual overview is
expected to lead us to make two points. First, the his‐
toricity of the notion of radicalisation seems to be entan‐
gled with concerns of denouncing threats to the status
quo and political ideologies that might cause change in
any kind. The plasticity of this notion combined with
this strong system justification feature might paradoxi‐
cally inform us more about the characteristics of groups
that use this notion and those of their targets. This
may lead us to the second point. Seen through these
lenses, the post‐September 11 use of the term “radical‐
isation” to designate almost exclusively violent political
actions stemming from Jihadist groups such as ISIS and
Al‐Qaeda might indicate that the past left‐wing utopias
have now lost to Islamism being perceived by individuals
as the only viable counter‐hegemonic utopia in the age
of globalization.
3. Social, Economic and Political Root‐Causes of
Radical Mobilisation
As Gurr (1969) pointed out earlier angry people rebel.
Some youngsters become increasingly angry and radi‐
calised as a result of a variety of root causes. No con‐
sensus emerged on the root causes of radicalisation.
Competing narratives co‐existed from its inception
between socio‐economic and political marginalization
and grievances on the one hand and ideological
motivations on the other hand. In the aftermath of
September 11, the term radicalisation became inter‐
twined with “recruitment” by extremists, who try to
persuade these angry individuals to join their war
(Coolsaet, 2019). Those who recruit these angry indi‐
viduals may be both Islamist extremists (e.g., ISIS,
Al Qaeda, and Boko Haram) and white‐supremacist
extremists (e.g., Identitarian Movement, Combat‐18,
and the Soldiers of Odin; CEP, 2019). In the mean‐
time, some other terms, such as “self‐radicalisation,”
“flash radicalisation,” and “instant radicalisation,” were
also added into the vocabulary of radicalisation since
it appeared that one could also develop into a vio‐
lent extremist through kinship and friendship networks
(Coolsaet, 2019). Such a vocabulary can be extended
even more. However, one needs to benefit from an inter‐
disciplinary perspective to understand the root causes of
radicalisation without causing a confusion with regard to
themeanings of the terms such as radicalisation, extrem‐
ism, and terrorism. This confusion can be resolved by
analysing the socio‐economic, political, spatial, and psy‐
chological drivers of radicalisation. To that effect, some
earlier interventions made in the disciplines of sociology,
politics, anthropology, geography, and psychology could
be beneficial in understanding the root‐causes of radicali‐
sation aswell as theways inwhich radicalising individuals
mobilise themselves.
Focusing on the early 19th century social move‐
ments, Calhoun (2011) makes a three‐fold classification
of radicalism: philosophical radicalism, tactical radical‐
ism, and reactionary radicalism. Philosophical radicalism
of theoristswas about penetrating to the roots of society
with rational and analytical programs to understand the
structural transformation of the public sphere. Tactical
radicalism of activists was mainly about their search for
immediate change that required the use of violence and
other extreme actions to achieve it. Finally, reactionary
radicalismof those suffering from the detrimental effects
of modernization was more about their quest for saving
what they valued in communities and cultural traditions
from eradication by capitalism. These categories are not
mutually exclusive. Following this line of thinking, the
leaders of the Reformation were radicals as they claimed
to take back what was essential to Christianity from the
hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. In philoso‐
phy, René Descartes was radical in his attempt to analyse
knowledge by thinking through its elementary conditions
anew. In everyday life, there were also radical individuals
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who challenged hierarchical order by judging basic mat‐
ters for them—guided by their divine inner light, senses,
and reason (Calhoun, 2011).
Radicalism cannot be understood as a stable ideo‐
logical position. Ideas that are radical at some point
could be liberal or even conservative for another. Liberals
and democrats of the 19th century were the radicals
of their age. It is no longer possible to call them as
such. The 1968 generation was also radical in the sense
that they challenged the patriarchal socio‐political order.
The radicals of the 1968 generation were different from
the radicals of the 19th century. Similarly, the radicals
of the present are also very different from the former
ones. Departing from the theory of social movements,
Calhoun (2011) claims that the defence of tradition by
nationalist, nativist, populist, and/or religious groups has
also become a radical stance today. He even continues to
suggest that this sort of populism and conservatism “has
been important to struggles for democracy, for inclusion
in the conditions under which workers and small propri‐
etors live” (Calhoun, 2011, p. 250).
Charles Tilly’s explanation of collective action is also
instrumental for social scientists to better understand
the distinctive characteristics of mobilization at present
time, and radical mobilisation in this case. He makes dis‐
tinctions among three different forms of mobilization:
defensive, offensive, and preparatory. Defensive mobi‐
lization is often bottom‐up. A threat fromoutside such as
globalism, capitalism, or injustice, induces the members
of a group to pool their resources to fight of the enemy.
Tilly classifies the radical food riots, tax rebellions, inva‐
sions of fields, and draft resistance in contemporary
Europe as defensive forms of mobilization. One could
also list nativist and Islamist youth mobilizations in the
same cluster. Offensive mobilization is often top‐down.
This could be a political alliance between bourgeois
and artisans to produce the Great Reform Bill of 1832
that introduced radical changes to electoral system of
England and Wales (Tilly, 1977, p. 34). One could also
argue that the new political alliances organized by some
European right‐wing populist parties among various
social groups such as working‐class groups, precarious
groups, women, and LGBTI groups that generate a grow‐
ing stream of Islamophobic sentiments, may also fall into
this category (Kaya, 2019). Eventually, the last category
of mobilization according to Tilly (1977) is preparatory
mobilization, which is also a top‐down one. In this kind
ofmobilization, the group pools resources in anticipation
of future opportunities and threats. For instance, labour
unions store somemoney to cushion hardships that may
appear in the future in the form of unemployment, or
loss of wages during a strike. This is a kind of proactive
mobilization planned for future threats. Accordingly, one
could argue that PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against
the Islamization of the Occident), established first in
Dresden, can be named as preparatory form of mobi‐
lization as they seek to protect the Occident from the
Muslim “invasion” (Kaya, 2019).
There is also a strand of research in psychologywhich
relies on socio‐economic characteristics to understand
the root causes of radicalisation. According to this strand,
the main driver of radicalisation is the perception of
grievance—conflicting identities, injustice, oppression,
or socio‐economic exclusion, for example—which can
makepeople receptive to extremist ideas. Taarnby (2005)
theorized that marginalization, alienation, and discrim‐
ination could be possible precursors to radicalisation
as they already lack the sense of self‐worth that is
afforded by social connectedness. Global injustice has
become more and more visible in the last three decades
through the modern networks of communication. Civil
war or deep‐rooted conflicts, invasion and occupation
by foreign military forces, economic underdevelopment,
bad governance and corruption penetrating the state at
all levels, rapid modernization, de‐industrialization and
technological developments such as the rise of inter‐
net and social media are all different kinds of factors
which have fostered existing socio‐economic inequalities
(Dalgaard‐Nielsen, 2008). On top of marginalization and
economic deprivation, lack of political opportunities is
often added to such a list as well as social exclusion, dis‐
affection of a religious/ethnic minority, wrongful foreign
policy, etc. (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015, p. 20). Socio‐economic
grievances felt by various individuals may also feed in
the competition of different social groups in a way that
leads to the construction of group identification in the
form of “in‐groups” and “out‐groups” (Allport, 1954;
Tajfel, 1981).
4. Islamic Radicalisation: The Revival of Honour as a
Response to Global Injustice
This section will elaborate the peculiarities of religious
radicalisation with an emphasis on the ways in which
some self‐identified Muslim youngsters react to the per‐
ils of modernisation and globalisation. Religious and
ethno‐cultural resurgence may be interpreted as a symp‐
tom of existing structural social, economic, political,
and psychological problems such as unemployment,
racism, xenophobia, exclusion, assimilation, alienation,
and anomie. Scientific data uncover that migrant‐origin
groups tend to affiliate themselves with politics of iden‐
tity, ethnicity, religiosity, honour, culture, and some‐
times violence in order to tackle such structural con‐
straints (Clifford, 1987; Kaya, 2012).
Since the Gulf War in the early 1990s Islam has
become a political instrument for many people in the
world to be employed as a self‐defence mechanism
against different ills such as humiliation, subordination,
exclusion, discrimination, injustice, and racism. Religion
seems to be winning ground in the absence of a global
leftist movement. De Certeau (1984, p. 183) reminds us
of the discursive similarities between left and religion:
left offering a different future, religion offering a different
world, and both offering solidarity. Though the left and
Islam both promise a different world to their adherents,
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 204–214 207
they radically differ from each other in the sense that
the former offers a world that is not yet to come, and
the latter offers a world that was already experienced in
the past. To put it differently, the left offers a prospective
world while Islam offers a retrospective one.
Some segments of the Muslim‐origin youth in the
West go through a crisis of home. While immigrants
who are more integrated do not experience a great loss
of significance as a result of discrimination, their less
integrated peers suffer from isolation, alienation, and
loss of significance (Lyons‐Padilla et al., 2015). Lately,
many young self‐identifiedMuslims do not feel that they
belong to their countries of settlement where they are
bound to question whether they are accepted or not by
the majority societies (Lyons‐Padilla et al., 2015). During
such critical junctures, aversion to the context in the
country of settlement seems stronger than attraction to
Syria, Palestine, Yemen, or the Middle East in general.
In this sense, joining an organization or an association
might offer a sense of belonging and purpose, and the
promise of recognition and status for already marginal‐
ized Muslim youth who feel betwixt and between the
positions constrained by social‐economic, political, and
legal arrangements alienating them from their country of
settlement. As already discussed by van Gennep (1908)
and Turner (1974) in different contexts, this kind of rite
of passagemight amplify liminal phase of being stateless
andhomeless as a sort of disaffiliation, afterwhich a com‐
bative oath is taken in the form of re‐grouping that clears
the way for a reconstitution and re‐affiliation of com‐
munity of brotherhood (ihkwaniyya), or umma in a new
re‐imagined home called Sham (Levant, extending from
the Antakya region of Turkey, through Syria, Lebanon,
Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and round to the Sinai peninsula
in Egypt). For instance, such emblematic rituals in Syria
foster newly found social bondage and self‐identification
(Alloul, 2019, p. 228). Under such circumstances, Syria or
other Muslim countries under perceived siege, such as
Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, become a highly sym‐
bolic counter‐space, or “consequential geography” for
staging actual politics against a former home in Europe
(Alloul, 2019, p. 229).
4.1. Unconventional Forms of Political Participation
Most of our self‐identified Muslim interlocutors have
often underlined their engagement in street demonstra‐
tions organised to show solidarity with their Muslim
peers suffering in Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, and
Xinjiang Uyghur region of China. Almost all the Muslim
youngsters interviewed, both men and women, have
expressed their reluctance to join unconventional forms
of political participation such as street demonstrations
with only one exception. There were a small minority
expressing their support for some street demonstrations
organised by some native groups such as Yellow Vests
demonstrations in France and Black Lives Matter demon‐
strations all over Europe. If the street demonstrations are
about showing solidarity with the Muslims in the other
parts of the world, then there is the strong tendency to
actively take part in such demonstrations. The statement
made by a 30‐year‐old‐Moroccan male is exemplary in
this sense. He said the following when asked what he
thinks about taking part in street demonstrations:
Before, there were more demonstrations, particu‐
larly on strictly political issues, linked to international
news.When I was younger, I remember taking part in
demonstrations for Palestine….We already felt that it
was useless, but it allowed us to show our number, to
show that there were many of us who were revolted
by what was happening in Palestine. It allowed us to
shout, to express our anger. (Interview conducted in
Paris, 6 September 2020)
Islam is no longer simply a religion, but also a counter
hegemonic global political movement, which prompts
many Muslims to stand up for justice and against
tyranny—whether in Palestine, Syria, Kashmir, Iraq, or
Lebanon. They are more likely to set up a link between
such perceived tyranny in remoteMuslim lands and their
countries of settlement that are somehow thought to be
responsible for the subordination of their Muslim peers.
Radicalisation of Muslim‐origin youngsters is a reac‐
tion to the ways in which they perceive to be subordi‐
nated by their countries of settlement, because radicali‐
sation might provide them with an opportunity to build
an imagined home away from the one that has become
indifferent and alienating. Hence, Craig Calhoun’s notion
of reactionary radicalism fits very well into the ways in
which the self‐identified young Muslims in our research
universe have expressed their discontent against the
detrimental effects of globalisation and modernisation
(Calhoun, 2011). Radicalisation then becomes a regime
of justification and an alternative form of politics gen‐
erated by some self‐identified Muslim youth to protect
themselves from day‐to‐day discrimination. In this sense,
self‐identified young Muslims generate a defensive form
of mobilisation with the members of their communities
(Tilly, 1977). They believe that speaking from themargins
might be a more efficient strategy to be heard by the
ones in the centre who have lost the ability to listen to
the peripheral ones. As Young (2004, p. 5) pointed out
it is not that “they” do not know how to speak (politics),
“but rather that the dominant would not listen.”
4.2. Resisting Intersectional Forms of Discrimination
Self‐identifiedMuslim youngsters may use different sym‐
bols to hold onto while expressing their discontent
against various forms of discrimination in everyday life
such as anti‐Muslim racism, or different manifestations
of Islamophobia or anti‐Muslim racism. Headscarf has
increasingly become a symbol of resistance that is being
employed by some young female Muslims to demon‐
strate their resistance and reaction against the increasing
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manifestations of Islamophobia in everyday life. Muslim
women are often victims of stereotyping, since their
religious beliefs are seen as the only defining element
of their identity in those European states where Islam
is not the religion of the majority of the population.
Unfortunately, media contribute to this phenomenon
by reporting on Muslim women mainly as victims of
so‐called “tribal matters,” “honour crimes,” and “blood
feuds” in relation to their clothing.
Self‐identifiedMuslim women’s clothing has continu‐
ously been linked with fundamentalism as a radical and
undemocratic interpretation of Islam, which has in turn
been linked with radicalisation and potential terrorism.
Political debate and legislative action concerningMuslim
women in Europe is mostly concentrated on the issues of
the headscarf, and even more the integral veil, instead
of focusing on non‐discrimination and equal opportuni‐
ties. The following testimony of a 22‐year‐old Muslim
woman with Turkish origin in Berlin said the following
when asked if she is interested in politics in everyday life:
The discussion [is mostly] about whether the head‐
scarf is being forcefully worn. Well, there are maybe
some women who are forced to wear a headscarf.
This occurs within a minority, but nobody talks to
the majority [of Muslims who wear the headscarf by
their own choice]. It is never about what wewant. It’s
only about representing us as a target. If one doesn’t
talk to us, then one can’t know what we want. This
is because many Muslims are not interested in poli‐
tics….Sometimes I get the impression that wearing a
headscarf you are only allowed to take the low‐skilled
jobs, but not the high‐skilled ones. That’s a paradox.
(Interview conducted in Berlin, 30 June 2020)
Our interlocutor addresses at the intersectionality of
social divisions of class, gender, religion, and ethnicity
(Crenshaw, 1991) in the case of different professions:
The headscarf is not a problem if the woman at stake is
working as cleaner, or taking care of children in a nurs‐
ery, but it becomes an impediment in professions which
require high skills. Like many other Muslim women, she
believes that her individual freedom is restricted under
the disguise of individual liberty imposed by the major‐
ity society. It is decided for her that she needs to be lib‐
erated from the headscarf which keeps her from “doing
things.” The paradox is that it is not the headscarf that
keeps her from doing things, but a dominant regime of
representation that is deemed to know better. In such a
context, headscarf might become a symbol of resistance
for Muslim women to demonstrate their discomfort by
appropriating a symbol that is denied and rejected by the
members of majority society.
Issues of intersectional discrimination among
Muslim women and men have become even more
complicated during the height of populism. Supporters
of right‐wing populist parties in Europe often share
the same motivation: to stop foreign infiltration of
Europe and resist globalization, which brings with it
international mobility, diversity, multiculturalism, trade,
and deindustrialization. The perceived infiltrators are
mainly those Muslims who are believed to be “stoning
their women,” “raping European women,” “molesting
children,” and “drug‐trafficking”. Self‐identified young
Muslim men are also subject to a set of intersectional
discrimination in everyday life. For instance, the sexual
assaults committed by immigrant men in Cologne on the
2016 New Year’s Eve have fuelled different forms of dis‐
crimination that youngMuslimmen in Europe have been
experiencing (Kaya, 2019). In addition to multiple forms
of discrimination in the labour market, education, poli‐
tics, and elsewhere, since then young Muslim men are
being perceived by many as potential rapists and terror‐
ists. It is a fact that competition between social groups
over scarce resources creates tensions that encourage
prejudices among individuals, who have a fundamen‐
tal need to perceive their own in‐group as superior
to competing out‐groups (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981).
A 30‐year‐oldMoroccanmale youngster from The Hague
said the following when asked about his opinion on mul‐
ticulturalism and diversity in the Netherlands:
Multiculturalism is part of the Dutch identity. A lot of
people are nowadays nostalgic and they are longing
for a time of “how it used to be.” But then you have to
go far back, migration has always been a part of the
Netherlands, it is not a newphenomenon.With every
new wave of migrants, you need a few generations
before they are truly settled in, look at the difference
between us and our parents….The problem is that
the Netherlands is polarized, and it is the extremes
that dominate the debate. It is always us versus them.
(Interview in The Hague, 10 September 2020)
Many self‐identified Muslim youngsters that we inter‐
viewed have stated that the existing societal and polit‐
ical polarisation appears to be motivated by a broader
authoritarian outlook entailing nostalgia for traditional
ways of doing things. These youngsters also perceive that
many European citizens see Muslims as signifiers of vast
social changes that have disruptedmore traditional ways
of life since the post‐war period. In a similar vein, sci‐
entific studies also demonstrate that these changes pro‐
duce some uncertainty and disquiet in the eyes of many
Europeans in ways that threaten the established con‐
cepts of nation, identity, culture, and tradition, as well
as the constitutive social hierarchies formany individuals
(Gest et al., 2017). Resorting to the past and becoming
nostalgic, in this sense, is a compensatory and reflective
code of conduct to mediate the tension between tradi‐
tion and change in a globalizing world.
4.3. In the Guidance of Honour in Times of Crisis
Individuals are more likely to use the languages that
they know best to express their concerns in everyday life
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such as poverty, exclusion, unemployment, humiliation,
and racism. If they are not into the language of delib‐
erative democracy, they are more likely to use the lan‐
guages they think they know the best, such as religion,
culture, ethnicity, past, and even violence. In an age of
insecurity, uncertainty, and anomy, disenfranchised indi‐
viduals may become more engaged in the protection of
their honour, which, they believe, is the only thing left.
Referring to Khaldun (1969), a 14th century sociologist in
North Africa, Ahmed (2003) claims that Muslims tend to
reify honour in the collapse of the Khaldunian notion of
asabiyya, an Arabic word meaning group loyalty, social
cohesion, or solidarity. Asabiyya is the cement that
brings individuals together through a shared language,
culture, and code of behaviour. There is a direct nega‐
tive correlation between asabiyya and the resurgence of
honour. The collapse of asabiyya on a global scale makes
Muslims to regenerate honour. Asabiyya dissolves for
the following reasons: massive urbanization, a popula‐
tion explosion, intense demographic changes, large scale
migrations, gap between rich and poor, the widespread
corruption andmismanagement of rulers, rampantmate‐
rialism coupled with the low premium on education, the
crisis of identity, and ideas and images which challenge
traditional values and customs (Ahmed, 2003).
Revitalizing honour serves at least a dual purpose for
the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming
to terms with the present without being seen to criticise
the existing status quo. Secondly, it also helps to recuper‐
ate a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed
down by others. In‐depth interviews with self‐identified
Muslim youngsters with both Turkish and Moroccan ori‐
gin have revealed that they all assign Islam a great task
guiding them in search of being a better person in the
world, which is identified with chaos, insecurity, instabil‐
ity, and polarisation. Islam provides them with a set of
values thatmake it possible for them to findmeaning and
stability. A 25‐year‐old Moroccan woman in The Hague,
the Netherlands, said the following when she was asked
what the role of religion was in her life:
Religion means everything to me. It makes me who
I am and the way I grow every day. I reflect on myself
every day: What have I done today that I could have
done better? I am patient, I know how to deal with
setbacks. I know how to be loving, I take care of the
poor and vulnerable. It teaches me how to live in
peace, it is leading for every decision I make. It is
important to be fair and just. (Interview in The Hague,
20 August 2020)
Islam gives guidance to many Muslim youngsters. This
was one of the most recurring tropes that we encoun‐
tered everywhere when we interviewed Muslims. Islam
as a religion restores the Asabiyya, social cohesion, in
the eyes of our interlocutors, and it offers each of
them a set of values that might help them navigate in
the everyday life that is full of intersectional forms of
discrimination, racism, inequality, and injustice. Values
refer to lasting priorities, aspirations, and wishes, and
they inspire attitudes and behaviour. Values are use‐
ful concepts when we seek to understand consistent
patterns of social, political, and cultural preferences
(Merino et al., 2021). To that effect, this is a kind of
search for certainty in the age of endemic uncertainties
brought about by globalization may prompt some young
Muslims to revitalise honour and purity. Essentialisation
and revival of honour and purity leaves no room for
the recognition of difference. The search for certainty
operates on an individual level irrespective of being in
majority, or in minority. Hence, the temptation not to
recognize ethno‐cultural and religious differences has
become a frequent act among individuals of any kind
complaining about the destabilizing effects of globaliz‐
ing uncertainties.
5. Right‐Wing Nativist Radicalisation: The Revival of
the Populist Nativism as a Response to Neo‐Liberal
Governance
On the other side of the same coin, one could also
observe similar acts of radicalisation performed by right‐
wing populist youth on the basis of anti‐multiculturalism,
Islamophobia, anti‐globalism, and Euroscepticism. Right‐
wing populist parties and movements often exploit the
issue of migration, especially the migration of Muslims,
and portray it as a threat to the welfare and the
social, cultural, and even ethnic features of a nation
(Ferrari, 2021). Populist leaders also tend to blame
a soft approach to migration for some major prob‐
lems in society such as unemployment, violence, crime,
insecurity, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. This
tendency is reinforced by a racist, xenophobic, and
demeaning discourse. Public figures like Geert Wilders
in the Netherlands have spoken of a “foreign infiltra‐
tion” of immigrants, especially Muslims, in their coun‐
tries. Wilders even predicted the coming of Eurabia, a
mythological future continent that will replace modern
Europe (Greenfield, 2013), where children from Norway
to Naples will learn to recite the Koran at school, while
their mothers stay at home wearing burqas.
Right‐wing populism is a response to and a rejec‐
tion of the order imposed by neoliberal elites, an
order that fails to use the resources of the demo‐
cratic nation‐state to harness global processes for local
needs and desires (Mouffe, 2018). Such populism results
from deep‐rooted structural disparities and general dis‐
advantage that mainstream political parties have so
far actively contributed to in their neoliberal gover‐
nance. Anthropological approaches mostly understand
populism as “the moods and sensibilities of the disen‐
franchised who face the disjuncture between everyday
lives that seem to become extremely anomic and uncon‐
tainable and thewider public power projects that are out
of their reach and suspected of serving their ongoing dis‐
enfranchisement” (Boyer, 2016; Kalb, 2011, p. 14).
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As Rodrigues‐Pose (2018, pp. 196–198), a geogra‐
pher, put it:
Populism as a political force has taken hold in many
of the so‐called spaces that do not matter, in num‐
bers that are creating a systemic risk. As in devel‐
oping countries, the rise of populism in the devel‐
oped world is fuelled by political resentment and
has a distinct geography. Populist votes have been
heavily concentrated in territories that have suf‐
fered long‐term declines and reflect an increasing
urban/regional divide.
It is not a surprise then to see that right‐wing populism
has become a recurring phenomenon in remote places
such as Dresden, Rotterdam, Lyon, and Aalst, as well
as rural and mountainous places that do not matter
anymore for the neo‐liberal political parties in the cen‐
tre that are heavily engaged in the flows of globaliza‐
tion such as international trade, migration, foreign direct
investment, and urbanization. The feelings of being left
behind in those remote places that “no longer matter”
in the eyes of the political centre may sometimes lead to
what one might call “spatial deprivation.”
5.1. Socio‐Economic, Spatial and Nostalgic Deprivation
in Remote Places
Youth in remote places which “no longer matter”
tend to become more appealed to the anti‐systemic
parties such as right‐wing populists because of their
growing socio‐economic disadvantages. However, socio‐
economic deprivation is not the only factor explaining
populism’s appeal. There are also some cultural and
memory factors that play an essential role. Many people
nowadays experience what Gest et al. (2017) call “nostal‐
gic deprivation,” which refers to an existential feeling of
loss triggered by the dissolution of established notions of
identity, culture, nation, and heritage in the age of global‐
isation (Godwin & Trischler, 2021). A growing number of
people is now longing for job security, stability, belong‐
ing, a sense of future, and also solidarity among workers
(Muehlebach & Shoshan, 2012, p. 318). Similarly, those
who live in the areas left behind may also become dis‐
sidents against the neo‐liberal political centre (Droste,
2021). Those having witnessed long periods of decline,
migration, and brain drain, those that have seen bet‐
ter times and remember them with nostalgia, and those
that have been repeatedly told that the future lays else‐
where have used the ballot box as their weapon. Their
sons and daughters are not different from their parents.
Those who could not go elsewhere for education or work
are not left with many options to find a compensatory
form of control in everyday life such as ethno‐national
radicalism, populism, nativism, and sometimes white
supremacism if not religion. Different forms of depriva‐
tion have been prevalent among the native youngsters
who live in socio‐economically deprived remote places.
A 23‐year‐old male youngster interviewed in Dresden
made the following statement when asked about the cur‐
rent economic state of his family:
After 2005, my father was unemployed twice within
ten years. After the reunification he had to go to
the KVP [Kasernierte Volkspolizei, Barracked People’s
Police] for a couple of months. The tavern he used
to work for was closed. Then he went to the police.
He became a cook for the kitchen of the riot
police. The kitchen there was privatized in 2006,
and after two years around 2007 and 2008 it was
closed. He was unemployed for a year. The munic‐
ipality did a public‐private partnership for a prison
kitchen, part of the business was tendered privately.
A sub‐contractor was in charge of the kitchen….He
was working in that kitchen for five years between
2009 and 2014….Instead of a 25‐year lasting work
contract and pension money, he was unemployed
again after four and a half years. (Interview in
Dresden, 10 November 2020)
Such feelings of socio‐economic, spatial and nostalgic
deprivation that one could see in an extract taken from
the interview often find channels of communicationwith
the outside world through the fear of Islam, migration
and diversity, that is highly promoted by right‐wing pop‐
ulist parties and movements in Europe.
5.2. Islamophobia and Anti‐Migrant Sentiments
The fear of Islam and migration is prevalent among the
radicalising native youngsters that we have interviewed.
A 25‐year‐old native male youngster in Rotterdam said
the following when asked about his opinion on the cur‐
rent state of migration in the Netherlands:
I think we should take care of war victims from Syria,
but as soon as it is safe in Syria they should return.
I think that is solidarity, you host them in times of
war and then they have to go back. But now we are
immediately giving these refugees passports and pri‐
ority on the housing market while there is a huge
housing shortage in the Netherlands. I am not a
racist but my own people first. Moreover, we do
not have the capacity in the Netherlands to receive
so many people….The problem is that we have a
huge shortage of housing and that refugees also
get prioritized for housing. (Interview in Rotterdam,
29 October 2020)
Populism as a reactionary form of radicalisation is not
a disease or irrational anomaly, as it is often portrayed,
but as the symptom of structural constraints that have
been disregarded by mainstream liberal political par‐
ties in power in the last three decades. Populism is a
systemic problem with deep structural causes. Populist
parties’ voters are dissatisfied with and distrustful of
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mainstream elites, who are perceived as cosmopolitan,
and they are hostile to immigration and growing ethno‐
cultural and religious diversity. While some of these
groups feel economically insecure, their hostility springs
from a combination of social‐economic, spatial, and nos‐
talgic deprivation resulting from their belief that immi‐
grants and ethno‐cultural and religious minority groups
are threatening societal and national security (Reynié,
2016). In other words, the anxieties driving support for
these parties are rooted not solely in socio‐economic
grievances but in cultural fears and a (cultivated) sense
of cultural threat coming from globalisation, immigra‐
tion, multiculturalism, and diversity, which have been
stocked by liberals too. Such fear of social‐economic, spa‐
tial, and nostalgic deprivation is likely to bring about
a form of reactionary radicalisation (Calhoun, 2011)
among self‐identified native youth residing in remote
places, who demonstrate the need to generate a defen‐
sive form of political mobilisation in alliance with their
peers in organised populist parties and social move‐
ments (Tilly, 1977).
At the very heart of the rise of right‐wing populist
nativism lies a disconnection between politicians and
their electorates. Right‐wing populist parties have gained
greater public support in the last decade in the mist of
two global crises: the financial and the refugee crises.
The former, combined with neoliberal governance, has
created socio‐economic deprivation for some Europeans,
while the latter has triggered nostalgic feeling that
established notions of identity, nation, culture, tradition,
and collective memory are endangered by immigration.
The populist moment has both strengthened many of
the former far‐right‐wing parties or created new ones
(Kaya, 2019).
5.3. “Lost in Diversity”
Right‐wing populists often construct a racialised enemy.
They feed on a culturally constructed antagonism
between the “pure people” and “the corrupt elite” and
other “enemies.” In Europe, right‐wing populists define
“the people” largely in ethno‐religious terms while more
or less openly rejecting the principle of equality. Despite
national variations, populist parties are characterised
by: their opposition to immigration and Islam; a con‐
cern for the protection of national culture and European
civilisation; adamant criticisms of globalisation, multicul‐
turalism, the EU, representative democracy, and main‐
stream political parties; and the exploitation of a dis‐
course of essentialised cultural difference, which is often
conflated with religious and national difference (Mudde,
2004). Our native interlocutors in remote places have
often laid blame on Islam for different kinds of ills that
they have experienced in everyday life. In other words,
Islam becomes an easy target, or a scapegoat, that is
being addressed by many of our interlocutors as an epit‐
ome of all kinds of maladies resulting from globalisation,
unemployment, mobility, diversity, anomy, deindustri‐
alisation, depopulation, and ambiguity. A 20‐year‐old
native male youngster in Oldenbroek in the Netherlands
said the following when asked to talk about himself
in general:
When I was 14 years old I “accidently” signed up as
a member for the SGP [Reformed Political Party, an
Orthodox Calvinist party] youth party….I am partic‐
ularly proud of two events I organized. One was a
debate about the refugee crisis in 2015, the whole
room was packed with people, I led the debate
and afterwards a lot of new members signed up
for our party. The other event I organized was in
2018, a debate about the danger of Islam in our
society, I called it: “Is the Islam a threat for the
Netherlands”? During the debate there was a lot
of security and police because we received threats
from several Muslims. (Interview in Oldenbroek,
17 September 2020)
Picking up the refugees and Islam has certainly brought
popularity and fame to this youngster, who also talked
a lot about the detrimental effects of globalisation on
his traditional community. His resentment against social
change resulting from the flows of globalisation finds
tune in his Islamophobic statements. It is a fact that
the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis of the
last decade have accelerated and magnified the appeal
of right‐wing populism in Europe. However, it would be
wrong to reduce the reasons for the populist surge to
these two crises. They have played a role, but they are
at best catalysts, not causes. After all, if “resentment”
and “reaction” as sociological concepts posit that losers
in the competition over scarce resources respond in frus‐
tration with diffuse emotions of anger, fear, and hatred
(Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981), then there are other pro‐
cesses that may well have contributed to generate such
resentment and reaction, such as de‐industrialization,
rising unemployment, growing ethno‐cultural diversity,
terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11, and
so on (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012).
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have seen that the notion of radicali‐
sation is not clear, while its use by politicians and state
authorities unambiguously targets political opponents
advocating changes in the system. Mostly, radicalisation
as a rhetorical tool allows neo‐liberal forms of govern‐
mentality to push their economic reforms, to downplay
the challenging aspects of radical groups against their
ideological hegemony and to do so by gathering major‐
ity support. The downside of this strategy, however, is
the rise of Islamist radicalisation and right‐wing populist‐
nativist radicalisation as a consequence.
Neoliberalism, which hides a corporate agenda
behind discourses advocating for the dismantlement of
the welfare state, leads to progressive social isolation
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and alienation of the individual. This in turn, leads indi‐
viduals to seek empowerment, and precisely, it is argued,
through identity politics. Thus, it is concluded that the
discourse surrounding radicalisation can partly explain
the parallel rise of reactionary forms of Islamist and
right‐wing populist radicalisation to express discontent
with the current social, economic and political climate,
because it allows to push further security and police
related policies within societies while rendering salient
divisive ethno‐religious and ethno‐cultural identity top‐
ics in the public sphere. The interviews conducted with
both self‐identified Muslims and self‐identified natives
demonstrated that radicalisation is the end of a causal
chain involving factors such as social‐economic, spatial,
and nostalgic forms of deprivation. However, one should
also be reminded that theymight be other powerful argu‐
ments raised in psychology to underline that radicalisa‐
tion cannot be reducible to a causal explanation rely‐
ing on structural factors, but it could also be explained
through emotions and group belonging dynamics.
Based on the theoretical interventions by Craic
Calhoun, Charles Tilly, Andrés Rodrigues‐Pose, Victor W.
Turner, Gordon W. Allport, and Henri Tajfel, as well as on
the empirical data driven from an ongoing field research
conducted in several European cities, this article con‐
cludes that the defence of religion, tradition, culture,
and past by religious, nationalist, nativist, or populist
groups has become a radical stance today. This radical
stance can be interpreted as a reactionary form of resis‐
tance against the perils of modernisation and globalisa‐
tion experienced by both self‐identified Muslim and self‐
identified native youth groups in Europe. As the chan‐
nels of communication between these two groups are
rather limited, or even non‐existent, they cannot refrain
themselves from co‐radicalising each other on the basis
of religio‐political and ethno‐cultural differences since
September 11. This article suggests that both Islamist
revival and right‐wing populism can be regarded as out‐
cries of those who feel pressurised by the perils of mod‐
ernisation and globalisation. Then, one could also assess
these protests as struggles for democracy, rather than
threats to democracy.
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